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ژوئن 4, 2022

Explained: Engaging with the Taliban

When India sent an official delegation to Kabul earlier this week, it was the first time that New Delhi signalled that it wanted a formal engagement with the Taliban.
With this, it appears that the Indian foreign and security establishment is less divided about the need to engage formally with the Taliban and prevent getting marginalised in a country that New Delhi sees as vital to its strategic interests in the region, and where the people’s affection for India is legendary.
Although recognition of the Taliban government is not on the cards yet, Thursday’s visit may have paved the way for the reopening of the Indian embassy, albeit a downgraded one.
From 1996 to now, India’s journey from first opposition, then diffidence to engaging with the Taliban, to the resigned acceptance of its inevitability, is in no small measure a story of India’s problematic relationship with Pakistan.Best of Express PremiumPremiumPremiumPremiumPremium
In 1996, when the Taliban fought their way through warring mujahideen factions into Kabul for the first time, India, fearing a spillover on Kashmir insurgency (there was indeed some), backed the Northern Alliance with money and weapons. As the scholar Avinash Paliwal has pointed out (My Enemy’s Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Union to the US Withdrawal), New Delhi did briefly contemplate opening contacts with the group but dropped the idea as the establishment was divided on reaching out to a group tied to Pakistan.
India bore the brunt of this nexus twice. During the 1999 hijacking of IC814, when the Pakistani hijackers took the plane to Kandahar, the then ruling Taliban acted as a support arm of the hijackers. Second, in 2008, the CIA traced the bombing of the Indian Embassy at Kabul to the Haqqani group, part of the Taliban and deeply embedded with the Pakistani security establishment. The bombing was reported to have been carried out at the orders of the ISI. Moreover, Lashkar -e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed were increasingly reported to be present in Afghanistan.
Reconsidering the Taliban
After 9/11, under the US umbrella, India invested money and energy into the rebuilding of Afghanistan. But by 2010, with increasing doubts about the US continuance, India was once again considering reaching out to the Taliban.
In the final months of UPA-2, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef , who was the Ambassador in Pakistan in the Taliban’s first regime, made a splash at a literary event in Goa. He had been invited as the author of the bestselling My Life with the Taliban. Then Home Minister P Chidambaram was in a photograph that also included him. Then in the opposition, the BJP trained its guns at the government for keeping company with an Islamist extremist.
Media reports then quoted government sources as saying it was not Zaeef’s first visit, and that keeping a door open to the Taliban was necessary. The reasons were the same as they are today: New Delhi did not want to be left out or marginalised in the Afghanistan of the future. After getting Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011, the Obama Administration was getting ready to declare an end to the war, and the US and the Taliban had already made tentative contact towards talks.
But with Pakistan continuing to loom large – the Pakistan security establishment, which had a huge role in the birth of the Taliban, had given Mullah Omar and other Taliban leaders sanctuary in Quetta after the 2001 US invasion, and sustained them with money and weapons — New Delhi did not have the will to pursue the plan seriously.
Pakistan shadow
As talks between the Taliban and the Trump Administration took off, the Indian establishment decided to put its weight behind President Ashraf Ghani and the government of Afghanistan, which had been left out of the talks. When it became increasingly clear that far from collapsing, the talks might actually lead to Taliban rule or at least a set-up in Kabul with a significant Taliban presence, India flagged “concerns” about terrorism, even as it looked for a seat at the table in any of the several regional groups, and also for openings to the Taliban.
One view was to build relations with factions in the Taliban that were opposed to Pakistan, but there was little clarity on how strong such factionalism was, and if such factions had any influence. An Indian diplomat who had been approached by a Taliban leader once in a foreign capital said talking to the Taliban was “the same as talking to the ISI”.
It was evident that India had missed the bus. Pakistan had delivered the Taliban to the Trump Administration for talks. Russia was backing the Taliban fully as the future ruler of Afghanistan, seeing in this sweet revenge for its own defeat in Afghanistan by US-financed, Pakistan-trained mujahideen; Iran, also glad at America’s defeat at the hands of the Taliban, hosted a delegation of the Shia-persecuting group in Tehran. China leveraged its relationship with Pakistan to get a foot into Kabul.
Nine months after the Taliban took over Kabul, 15 countries have a diplomatic presence in the country. Pakistan, China and Russia never shut down; others, including the EU, have re-opened to facilitate to humanitarian assistance. The Taliban regime is not recognised by any country yet. When members of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation’s anti-terror sub-group met in Delhi recently to discuss the situation in Afghanistan, host India was the only one without a diplomatic presence in Kabul.
Counter-intuitive timing
India’s cautious opening to the Taliban has come at a time when the group has made it clear it has not changed from its previous mediaevalism. Restrictions on women have increased, from not being allowed to attend school to curbs on free movement in public spaces and at work. A UN Taliban monitoring committee has reported that the Taliban continue to remain close to al-Qaeda, with a significant presence of its multinational fighting force in Afghanistan. The report has also flagged JeM and LeT training camps in Nangarhar and Kumar, close to the Pakistan border. India is the chair of the Taliban sanctions committee.
However, a view that has gained ground in the Indian establishment is that it is time to de-hyphenate Pakistan from the Taliban, especially as the Pakistan security establishment is finding the going tough with the Kabul regime.
The Pakistani Taliban (TTP), which has spread terror in Pakistan since it came into existence in 2007, has found sanctuary in Afghanistan, and it has taken several rounds of negotiations mediated by the Afghan Taliban for the Pakistan security establishment to arrive at a ceasefire with the TTP. There are other disagreements between the Kabul regime and Pakistan, including over Durand Line as the border between the two countries.
Another reason advanced for India’s change in policy is that the Taliban in power are more divided than they were as a fighting force, and that the situation may provide room for a layered political and diplomatic engagement with different actors. It has also helped that the Taliban have made no hostile statements on Kashmir since taking over in Kabul.

The ban on girls’ high-school education is reported to have brought out rifts in the open between hardliners led by supreme leader Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada and others seen as pro-West Taliban, such as Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai. In all this, the Haqqani are projecting themselves as the true moderates.
Gautam Mukhopadhaya, a former Indian Ambassador to Kabul, said the hardening of the regime, widening internal rifts, and the resistance against the Taliban getting more organised made for a “far from stable Taliban rule”.
As long as the move helps the Afghan people, facilitating humanitarian assistance through international organisations, and paving the way for access to consular services, Mukhopadhaya said it was a step in the right direction.
“It is a good move towards Afghan people, provided the [Afghan] opposition is being taken into confidence and is kept in touch with on a parallel track, and basic principles are not sacrificed for formal relations,” Mukhopadhaya said.

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ژوئن 4, 2022

Explained: A not-for-profit company with defined objectives

The Enforcement Directorate on Wednesday, summoned Sonia Gandhi and Rahul Gandhi following a trial court order that allowed the Income Tax Department to probe the affairs of the National Herald newspaper — owned by AJL— and conduct a tax assessment of Sonia and Rahul.
BJP MP Subramanian Swamy had in his complaint in 2013 alleged cheating and misappropriation of funds on part of the Gandhis in acquiring the newspaper. He had alleged that the Gandhis acquired properties owned by the National Herald by buying the newspaper’s erstwhile publishers, AJL, through an organisation called Young India — a Section 25 company — in which they have 86% stake. Sonia and Rahul had been granted bail in the case by the trial court on December 19, 2015.
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While the Congress has described the case as “weird” since “no money was involved”, it said that AJL became an indebted company and it converted its debt into equity by assigning its debt to a new company— Young India — and became debt-free.Best of Express PremiumPremiumPremiumPremiumPremium
The Congress has said that since Young India has been created under a special provision of the Companies Act — Section 25 — it has to be a not-for-profit company and no dividend can be given to its shareholders or directors.
So, what is a Section 25 company?
As per the Companies Act, 1956, a Section 25 company — similar to what is defined under Section 8 under Companies Act, 2013 — is a not-for-profit charitable company formed with the sole object of “promoting commerce, art, science, religion, charity, or any other useful object, and intends to apply its profits, if any, or other income in promoting its objects, and to prohibit the payment of any dividend to its members”.
Section 8 of the Companies Act, 2013 includes other objects such as sports, education, research, social welfare and protection of environment among others.

While it could be a public or a private company, a Section 25 company is prohibited from payment of any dividend to its members. Section 25 states that by its constitution the company is required/ intends to apply its profits, if any, or other income in promoting its objects and is prohibited from paying any dividend to its members.”
What are prominent examples of Section 25 or Section 8 companies?
According to details available with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, a large number of companies have been formed under the Section. Among these are Reliance Foundation, Reliance Research Institute, Azim Premji Foundation, Coca Cola India Foundation, and Amazon Academic Foundation.
Why are companies formed under Section 25 when there is a Trust structure in place?
Experts say that most people looking to form a charitable entity go for forming a company under Section 25, now Section 8, rather than a Trust structure because most foreign donors like to contribute to a company rather than Trust because they are more transparent and provide more disclosures.
Tax experts say that if a company has to be converted into a not for profit company, they can’t be converted into a Trust, however, they can be converted into a Section 25/ Section 8 company.

می 19, 2022

Explained: What is VPN, now being targeted by the Govt? What should you know before using one?

The government issued a stark warning to virtual private network (VPN) service providers on Wednesday (May 18): adhere to the cybersecurity rules released by the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) or wrap up operations in the country.
“If you’re a VPN that wants to hide and be anonymous about those who use VPNs and you don’t want to go by these rules, then if you want to pull out (from the country), frankly, that is the only opportunity you will have. You will have to pull out,” Minister of State for Electronics and IT Rajeev Chandrashekhar said.

CERT-In is a wing of the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. Among its directives issued on April 26 is one that requires VPN service providers to maintain, for five years or longer, details such as validated names of customers, the period for which they hired the service, the IP addresses allotted to them, their email addresses, time stamps, etc.
The government wants these details to fight cybercrime. On the other hand, privacy is the main selling points of VPN services.
What is a VPN?
It is what the name suggests — a private network that is virtually created when you surf the Web. Every time you switch on your VPN connection, a secure channel is created, which acts as an intermediary between your device and the destination webpage. Your data is then sent to an external VPN server, which then connects you to your destination.
However, when the VPN server does this, your IP address, which is the online equivalent of a user-specific postal code, is changed — and thus websites are unable to accurately track your location. This private network promotes online safety and enhances your overall privacy on the Web.
How does VPN work?
Imagine you are driving somewhere from your home in your car. The number plate of your car is your IP address. Everyone on the road can see where you are headed, and can use the number plate to track your car back to you. This is like browsing online in the normal way — without a VPN.

Using this same analogy, when you use a VPN, you are able to take a different, hidden road that leads to the same destination, but no one can see you on it, and the hidden road changes your number plate for the journey and then again when you come back home.
Essentially then, no one knows where you’ve been, how, and for how long.
But what’s the point?
Privacy: That’s the obvious advantage. Without a VPN connection, websites can see your IP address, and use it to accurately identify your identity and location. It’s like walking around with your name, address, age, and a full list of where you have been over the past week printed on the back of your shirt — or perhaps handing over your business card with your address on it to every person you meet.
Safety: A VPN would prevent everyone from the government to cyber criminals to track you easily. Using a VPN can delink your online activity from your IP address. A VPN will also protect your Internet traffic, keeping it encrypted the whole time.

Location spoofing: Another common reason why people use VPNs is to get around georestrictions. To take a simple example, certain films or other content may not be available in your region — Netflix, for instance, knows every time you connect from your home region, and which movie should not be on the menu.
But if you were to use a VPN, Netflix could think you’re visiting the website from another region, one where the said movie is not banned. Platforms such as Netflix are aware of this, and have been cracking down on users who try to circumvent these geolocation blockers.
Getting around online censorship: Many countries block access to various websites, which you cannot visit if you’re from those countries. A VPN allows you to bypass such restrictions.
Free access to the Web is an important element of the freedom of speech and expression. Journalists and activists often use VPNs to access platforms that would otherwise be inaccessible, and communicate without government restrictions.
What if the secrecy is misused?
That is what governments argue. Restrictions of the kind imposed by India can deter cybercriminals and prevent a range of crimes such as identity theft, online fraud, cyberbullying, stalking, etc. As our lives are increasingly lived online, we are more vulnerable to these crimes, especially those who do not understand how the Internet works and the risks it can pose.
Are there any practical problems?
Your Internet could slow down. Since VPNs require your traffic to be routed via a VPN server, it could take longer to reach your destination website. Also, VPN users are also often actively denied access to certain websites and services.
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It is important to remember that a VPN cannot help if you download a malicious file, are tricked into entering your personal details on a scam website, or if you’re logged in with an identifiable account like a Google account that can be traced back to you irrespective of your IP address.
Also, remember that the VPN service knows which websites you are visiting. It is important, therefore, to trust your provider. Paid VPN services like NordVPN or Surfshark VPN will charge you a subscription, will offer extra features, support for multiple devices, and better speeds. Free VPN apps and services will often restrict you to lower speeds and may misuse or sell your data.

آوریل 13, 2022

Explained: Ruins of Mariupol port could become Russia’s first big prize in Ukraine

The Sea of Azov port of Mariupol, reduced to a wasteland by seven weeks of siege and bombardment that Ukraine says killed tens of thousands of civilians, could become the first big city captured by Russia since its invasion.
Russia said on Wednesday more than 1,000 Ukrainian marines, among the last defenders holed up in the Azovstal industrial district, had surrendered, though Ukraine did not confirm that.
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Here is why the city’s capture would be important.
STRATEGIC LOCATION
Mariupol, home to more than 400,000 people before the war, is the biggest Ukrainian city on the Sea of Azov and the main port serving the industries and agriculture of eastern Ukraine. It is also the site of some of Ukraine’s biggest metals plants.
On the eve of the war, it was the biggest city still held by Ukrainian authorities in the two eastern provinces known as the Donbas, which Moscow has demanded Ukraine cede to pro-Russian separatists.

Its capture would give Russia full control of the Sea of Azov coast, and a secure overland bridge linking mainland Russia and pro-Russian separatist territory in the east with the Crimea peninsula that Moscow seized and annexed in 2014.
It would unite Russian forces on two of the main axes of the invasion, and free them up to join an expected new offensive against the main Ukrainian force in the east.
Prominent among the Ukrainian forces that have defended Mariupol is the Azov Regiment, a militia with far right origins incorporated into Ukraine’s national guard. Russia has portrayed destroying that group as one of its main war aims.
HUMANITARIAN IMPACT
The siege of Mariupol has been the worst humanitarian catastrophe of the conflict, described by Kyiv as a war crime. Ukrainian officials say at least 20,000 civilians were killed there by Russian forces employing tactics of mass destruction used in earlier campaigns in Syria and Chechnya.
International organisations such as the Red Cross and the United Nations say they believe thousands died but the extent of suffering cannot be assessed yet because the city has been cut off.
Ukrainian officials have said around a third of the population escaped before the siege, a similar number got out during it, while around 160,000 were trapped inside. They sheltered for weeks in cellars with no power or heat, or access to outside shipments of food, water or medicine.

Daily attempts to send convoys to bring in aid and evacuate civilians failed throughout the siege, with Ukraine blaming Russia for looting shipments and refusing to let buses pass through the blockade. Moscow said Ukraine was to blame for failing to observe ceasefires.
Bodies have been buried in mass graves or makeshift graves in gardens. Ukraine says Russia has brought in mobile crematorium trucks to burn bodies and destroy evidence of killings.
Among the major incidents that drew international outcry was the bombing of a maternity hospital on March 9, when wounded pregnant women were photographed being carried out of rubble. A week later, the city’s main drama theatre was destroyed. Ukraine says hundreds of people were sheltering in its basement, and it has not been able to determine how many were killed. The word “children” had been spelled out on the street in front of the building, visible from space.
Russia denies targeting civilians in Mariupol and has said, without presenting evidence, that incidents including the theatre bombing and maternity hospital attack were staged. Kyiv and its Western allies dismiss this as a smear to deflect blame.
Ukraine says Russia forcibly deported thousands of Mariupol residents to Russia, including some unaccompanied children it views as having been kidnapped. Moscow denies this and says it has taken in refugees.
WHAT NEXT?
Western countries believe Russia’s initial war aim was to quickly topple the government in Kyiv, but Moscow has had to abandon that goal after armoured columns bearing down on the capital were repelled. Russia withdrew from northern Ukraine at the start of April and has said its focus is now on the areas claimed by the separatists in the east.

In recent days, a new Russian column has been moving into eastern Ukraine near the town of Izyum to the north of the Donbas. The fall of Mariupol could free up Russian troops in the south of the Donbas to mount an assault on Ukrainian forces from two directions.
Claiming its first big prize in eastern Ukraine could also give Russia a stronger position to negotiate at any peace talks.

آوریل 11, 2022

Explained: The slide of democracy in Hungary, and what the EU is doing about it

Viktor Orban, Hungary’s pro-Putin nationalist leader, won his fourth consecutive term, in the recently-held elections, which independent observers deemed free but not fair. Since then, the European Commission has launched a powerful mechanism that could potentially cut Hungary’s funding for breaching the rule of law.
The move comes in the backdrop of charges of corruption, and declining democracy in the landlocked central European country. Orban, a staunch far-right popular leader who has been at the helm since 2010, apart from his previous stints as the Prime Minister, came under intense scrutiny following his post-election speech. Orban not only called out the “bureaucrats” at Brussels, the administrative centre of the European Union, but also termed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as his “opponent”, laying bare his closeness to Russia.
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Why is Orban a controversial leader, and what is the EU doing about it? We explain.
A history of ‘illiberal’ governance
In a speech in 2018, Orban declared that ‘Christian democracy’ in Hungary “is by definition, not liberal”. “…it is, if you like, illiberal,” Orban said, adding that it differed from liberal democracy in three issues: “Liberal democracy is in favour of multiculturalism, while Christian democracy gives priority to Christian culture. Liberal democracy is pro-immigration, while Christian democracy is anti-immigration. And liberal democracy sides with adaptable family models, while Christian democracy rests on the foundations of the Christian family model.”
Orban’s anti-immigration stance, especially against Muslims from Middle-Eastern countries seeking asylum, has long troubled the European Union. In 2015, Reuters quoted him as saying, “We do not want to see a significant minority among ourselves that has different cultural characteristics and background. We would like to keep Hungary as Hungary”. In 2021, he went against European Law, criminalising lawyers and activists who help asylum seekers.
The US Freedom House has termed Hungary as “partly free”, the only EU member state to be ranked as such.
File photo of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, left, with Jaroslaw Kaczynski, center, the leader of Poland’s ruling party, Law and Justice, and Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, during the inauguration of a memorial for the Smolensk plane crash, in Budapest. (AP)
In a February 2022 report, the Human Rights Watch flagged renewed pressure over the LGBTQ+ community in Hungary, following an overturning of a ruling that held comparing LGBTQ+ members to paedophiles in the media as unfounded and offensive.
This followed a series of laws that sought to curb the freedom of the queer community. In 2020, the Hungarian Parliament passed a law making it impossible for trans and intersex people to legally identify as their preferred gender. It has also amended the definition of ‘family’ in its Constitution, effectively banning same-sex couples from adopting children. Further, a Hungarian law forbids exposing children to content around homosexuality.
Orban’s nationalist party, Fidesz, has also been called out for its hegemony over the media. The 2021 World Press Freedom Index ranks Hungary at 92, down from its 23rd position in 2010 when Orban came to power.

In a 2021 speech, Orban claimed that the government had increased its ownership to 55 per cent of local media. In fact, according to Atlatszo, a media watchdog and a member of the Global Investigative Journalism Network, in 2018, over 500 media outlets were owned by persons linked to the government and served as mouthpieces of Fidesz. Of these, only 31 outlets were pro-government in 2015.
Over the years, concerns have also been raised over the independence of the judiciary as well as corruption in the Orban government. The European Commission, in 2021, sent a letter to Budapest describing irregularities in its withdrawals from the EU Budget and questioning the excessive powers given to the President of the National Office for the Judiciary, Politico has reported.
Adding to the infringement cases raised against Hungary, the Commission in April 2022 pointed out the lack of transparency in its public procurement.
How has Hungary responded to the war in Ukraine?
Budapest’s stance on the Russian invasion of Ukraine is driving another wedge between the EU and Hungary, which is also a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Orban, during his election campaign, maintained that Hungary should remain neutral and not cut off its economic ties with Russia.

“This isn’t our war, we have to stay out of it,” Orban said, adding that supplying weapons to Ukraine could make it a target for Russia. “We condemn the Russian attack, but we cannot help the Ukrainians without simultaneously destroying ourselves,” he said on April 1, according to a statement provided by the Prime Minister’s Office.
The nationalist leader after coming to power has also said that Budapest would be willing to pay for Russian gas in Roubles – contradicting the EU’s call for a united front against Moscow’s threat to cut off gas supplies if not paid in its currency. While Orban has supported sanctions against Moscow, he has reportedly refused to back any sanctions on energy as Hungary depends heavily on Russian imports.
According to data provided by The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), in 2020, Russia was the largest importer of crude petroleum and petroleum gas in Hungary. It accounted for 57.2 per cent of Hungary’s imported crude petroleum ($1.05 billion) and 37.3 per cent of imported petroleum gas ($536 million). Overall, Hungary’s trade with Russia included $2.15 billion of imports.
Ukraine, however, has criticised Budapest’s stance saying that paying for Russian gas would “create additional sources of funding for Russia’s military machine.” The Ukrainian Foreign Minister called upon Orban to stop undermining the unity of the EU, Reuters reported. Hungary, however, has called Kyiv’s statements “insulting” to its people.
How is the EU looking to penalise Hungary?
The European Commission has already withheld Covid recovery funds earmarked for Hungary citing corruption, and for Poland, expressing concerns over the independence of the judiciary. Proceedings under ‘Article 7’ of the Treaty on EU were initiated against the two countries in 2018, which can revoke the voting rights of a member state for not complying with EU laws. However, as the unanimity of all member states is needed to suspend these rights, Poland and Hungary’s ties can potentially lead to them using their veto powers in favour of each other.
On April 5, the Commission’s President Ursula von der Leyen told the European Parliament, that the new Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism has been launched against Hungary. The mechanism came into force in January 2021, and Hungary is the first country against which procedures have been initiated. Budapest, consequently, stands to lose its funding from the EU after the Council makes a decision over its breaches of the rule of law.
The conditionality mechanism, however, has not yet been deployed against Poland. With Warsaw playing a pivotal role in the Russia-Ukraine war, and its criticism of Hungary’s neutral stance, the Commission’s move could further separate the two countries. von der Leyen also indicated that they were “close” to releasing the pandemic-recovery funds to Poland, as soon as it fulfils the criteria laid out by the EU Court of Justice for ensuring an independent judiciary.

Hungarian ministers have criticised the Commission’s decision, with Orban’s chief of staff saying that the EU was punishing Hungarian voters for exercising their franchise.
If blocked from EU cash, the Hungarian economy will take a severe hit. A Bloomberg report states that EU funds made up more than 10 per cent of Hungary’s budget revenue in 2020. Now, it stands to lose a part or all of the nearly 36 billion Euros (based on current prices) that the EU has allocated for Hungary for the period 2021-27 apart from the already withheld Covid-recovery fund of 7.2 billion Euros.